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Abstract 
 
Some studies argue that the Fed reacts to financial market developments. Using data covering 
the period 1985:Q1 - 2008:Q4 and employing an augmented Taylor rule specification, we re-
examine that conjecture. We find that evidence in favour of such a reaction is largely driven 
by the Fed’s behaviour during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
The 2007-2008 crisis was of a greater order of magnitude as compared to previous 
recent episodes of financial distress. It led to nominal rates that reached the zero lower bound 
in December 2008 and the adoption of non-conventional monetary policies (e.g. large scale 
asset purchases) aiming, at least initially, to stabilise financial markets. Moreover, it has 
rekindled the academic debate of the late 1990s on whether the appropriate response of 
monetary policy to financial developments is proactive (Cecchetti et al. 2000) or reactive 
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1999). 
 In a recent theoretical paper, Curdia and Woodford (2010) argue that the standard 
Taylor rule can be improved by incorporating credit risk measures but the optimal size of 
adjustment depends on the source of the variation in credit spreads. As an empirical matter, 
there is evidence for changes in the Fed’s stance during the Greenspan era in times of 
heightened financial and economic uncertainty (Alcidi et al., 2011; Gnabo and Moccero, 
2013).  Consistent with that evidence, studies covering the recent crisis period find that 
monetary policy focus shifted from price stabilisation towards financial stability (Baxa et al., 
2013; Martin and Milas, 2013). 
This paper contributes to the existing literature by providing a comprehensive 
examination of the Fed’s response to financial market developments. We not only consider 
the possibility of an indirect reaction and that of a direct reaction, but also test whether the 
response is asymmetric, varying across the business cycle. Furthermore, we isolate the impact 
of the 2007-2008 crisis in an effort to examine how important it is for the overall findings. 
Finally, we consider four alternative dimensions of financial markets stress, related to credit 
risk, stock market illiquidity, whether markets are generally depressed (bear markets) and 
overall deterioration in financial conditions. Our bottom line is that evidence that the Fed has 
in the past reacted to financial market developments is largely driven by the Fed’s behaviour 
during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. 
 
2.  Methodology 
Following Clarida et al. (2000), the empirical analysis in this paper is based on a 
forward-looking Taylor rule. Future inflation is proxied by a survey-based measure of one-
year-ahead inflation forecast, allowing us to employ OLS estimation instead of GMM with ex 
post inflation data (Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, 2011).  
In order to examine whether the Fed reacts directly to financial market developments, 
the standard Taylor rule regression model is augmented by financial factors: 
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  41 1ˆ1
n n
t j t t t j t j tj j
i y x i                    (1) 
 
where ti  is the short term interest rate, ρ denotes the degree of policy inertia, t k   is the 
expected inflation rate k periods ahead, ˆty  represents the contemporaneous output gap, tx  is 
a financial market variable, and t  is the error term.
1
  
It is well-known that deteriorating financial conditions tend to coincide with weak 
economic performance. Hence, if the Fed reacts asymmetrically to financial market 
developments, in line with the “Greenspan-Bernanke put” conjecture, its response should 
vary across the business cycle, being stronger during recessions.  Eq. (2) tests the asymmetric 
reaction hypothesis: 
 
    41 1ˆ1 1
n nR R NR R
t j t t t t j t j tj j
i y D x D x i                    (2) 
 
where D
R
 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 to indicate US recessions as classified 
by the NBER and zero otherwise. μR and μNR are the reaction parameters to the financial 
variable during recessions and expansions, respectively.  
We also investigate the possibility of the Fed reacting indirectly to financial market 
developments by changing its response to inflation and the output gap during periods of high 
vs. low financial stress. To do so, we construct four financial stress dummy variables, as 
described in Section 3 below, and estimate Eq. (3):  
 
      4 41 1ˆ ˆ1 1 1
n nD X ND X D X ND X
t j t t t t j t j tj j
i D D D y D y i                      
           (3) 
where D
X 
is a dummy that takes value 1 if financial market stress is intense and zero 
otherwise. The reaction coefficients to inflation and the output gap during intense financial 
stress are denoted by βD and γD, respectively.  
 Finally, we isolate the impact of the recent recession/financial crisis on the Fed’s 
direct and indirect response to financial market developments by re-estimating Eqs. (2) and 
(3) and replacing the recession and financial stress dummies with the dummy variable D
07-08
 
that takes the value of 1 only during 2007:Q4 - 2008:Q4. 
 
                                                          
1
 With our quarterly data, n is set to 2 to account for serial correlation, while k is equal to 4. 
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3.   Data 
We use quarterly data over the sample period 1985:Q1 - 2008:Q4. The end of the 
sample period corresponds to the point in time when the zero lower bound was reached. The 
data on the effective Federal Reserve funds rate (it), real GDP (yt), the spread between the 
Moody’s Baa corporate bond yield and Aaa corporate bond yield (CSPR), and the year-on-
year percentage change in the S&P 500 stock price index (SP500) is collected from the FRED 
database. In addition, we use the Citi Financial Conditions Index (FCI) and the aggregate 
stock market illiquidity index (LIQ)
2
. The measure of expectations for one-year-ahead annual 
average inflation is provided by the Survey of Professional Forecasters.  
To construct financial market stress variables, we use the historical data on each 
financial variable and set threshold values that capture elevated stress levels. The first dummy 
D
FCI
 takes value 1 when the Citi FCI is below its historical average. Similarly, the credit 
spread dummy D
CSRP
 takes value 1 when the credit spread is above its historical average. The 
stock market stress is represented by the dummy D
SP500
 that takes value 1 when the S&P500 
index is below its 2-year moving average. Finally, D
LIQ
 identifies financial stress when the 
aggregate stock market liquidity index is below its historical average less one standard 
deviation. 
Figure 1 plots the dummies and related financial variables. The past episodes of 
financial stress such as the stock market crash in 1987 are captured quite well. In addition, 
periods of heightened financial instability tend to coincide with US recessions. The stock 
market and credit spread stress dummies capture all three recessionary episodes, while the 
last recession that commenced on December 2007 was associated with elevated levels in all 
our measures of financial stress.  
 
4.   Results 
4.1  Direct reaction 
  Table 1 reports the estimates of Eqs. (1) and (2) during 1985:Q1 – 2008:Q4. The 
results indicate that the “Taylor principle” holds across the augmented Taylor rule 
specifications, with the inflation coefficient estimates exceeding unity. Both the inflation and 
the output gap coefficients are highly significant. Moreover, all four financial variable 
coefficients in columns 1-4 of Table 1 are statistically significant with their signs indicating 
that the Fed eases monetary policy when financial markets deteriorate.  
                                                          
2
 The Citi FCI is available at: http://www.princeton.edu/~mwatson/publi.html. The aggregate stock market 
liquidity index is available at: http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/lubos.pastor/research/liq_data_1962_2011.txt  
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The empirical findings reported in columns 5-8 of Table 1 indicate that this direct 
response to financial markets is also asymmetric. Specifically, the Fed appears to respond 
more robustly to financial variables during recessions. On the other hand, the response 
coefficients are significantly smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant during 
expansions. Furthermore, the standard errors of the regressions decrease as compared to the 
previous symmetric specifications.  
 
4.2   Indirect reaction  
The estimates of Eq. (3) are presented in Table 2 columns 1 to 4. The results indicate a 
moderate change in the response to inflation during periods of financial stress. In particular, 
the inflation coefficient declines mildly but remains statistically significant in all 
specifications apart from the case of the stock market liquidity stress dummy. Meanwhile, the 
Fed’s reaction to the output gap typically becomes insignificant when financial stress peaks 
but the Wald test does not indicate any significant change. Hence, overall, our findings do not 
provide strong evidence in favour of a sharp change in the Fed’s response to inflation and 
output developments in times of financial stress. 
 
4.3  2007-2008 financial crisis  
The inclusion of earlier episodes of financial stress that were not as severe as the most 
recent one may attenuate the effect of the 2007-2008 crisis on our previous estimates of the 
indirect monetary policy reaction to financial variables. Replacing the financial stress 
dummies with the D
07-08 
variable that captures only the most recent crisis, the results in Table 
2 column 5 indicate a major change in the monetary policy response to inflation. Specifically, 
the inflation parameter decreases substantially, turning negative and statistically insignificant 
during the 2007-2008 crisis, with the Wald test identifying significant structural change.
 3
 On 
the other hand, the response to output remains highly significant over 2007-2008 and appears 
to increase in magnitude, albeit not sufficiently for the Wald test to identify a significant shift.  
Finally, the results in Table 3 indicate that constraining the recession dummy variable 
to be equal to 1 only during the latest recession/crisis, as D
07-08
 does, leads to similar findings 
with those in Table 1 (columns 5-8). Specifically, during the recent crisis all four financial 
market variables are significant at the 5% level or less. On the other hand, prior to 2007:Q4 
only the Citi FCI is significant and exhibits a notably lower coefficient. Thus, the evidence 
                                                          
3
 This is in line with recent evidence by Baxa et al. (2013) for the US and Martin and Milas (2013) for the UK. 
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for a direct response of monetary policy to financial markets that we previously identified is 
largely driven by recent developments.   
 
5.  Robustness checks 
Our results are robust to a series of robustness tests (available upon request). First, we 
used the Chicago National FCI, the spread between Moody's Baa corporate bond and 10-year 
US Treasury yields, and spread between 3-month LIBOR and US Treasury bill rates as 
alternative financial market variables. Second, we used real-time data on GDP to calculate the 
output gap. Finally, we used a GMM estimation approach instead of OLS.  
 
6.  Conclusions 
Using an augmented Taylor rule empirical framework, this paper examines whether 
the Fed responds to financial market developments. We find that evidence in favour of such a 
reaction is largely driven by the Fed’s behaviour during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. These 
findings highlight the exceptional character of the recent episode of financial turmoil. 
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1 
Figure 1: Financial market variables and financial stress dummies 
 
Notes: This figure plots four financial market variables, X, along with the corresponding dummies, DX, that identify 
periods of intense financial stress; X: City financial conditions index (FCI), Baa – Aaa corporate spread (CSPR), 
annual stock returns (SP500), and stock market illiquidity (LIQ). The shaded areas denote recessionary periods in 
the US based on the NBER business cycle dates.  
 
 
Table 1: Direct reaction to financial market developments 
 
 
 
FCI 
(1) 
CSPR 
(2) 
SP500 
(3) 
LIQ 
(4) 
FCI 
(5) 
CSPR 
(6) 
SP500 
(7) 
LIQ 
(8) 
α 
-1.32 
(1.04) 
1.61 
(1.38) 
-1.25 
(0.98) 
-0.18 
(1.13) 
-0.79 
(0.99) 
0.25 
(1.01) 
-0.33 
(1.04) 
0.06 
(1.06) 
ρ1 
1.44*** 
(0.09) 
1.35*** 
(0.09) 
1.40*** 
(0.10) 
1.47*** 
(0.09) 
1.38*** 
(0.08) 
1.32*** 
(0.07) 
1.38*** 
(0.09) 
1.39*** 
(0.10) 
ρ2 
-0.57*** 
(0.08) 
-0.48*** 
(0.08) 
-0.54*** 
(0.09) 
-0.58*** 
(0.08) 
-0.50*** 
(0.07) 
-0.44*** 
(0.06) 
-0.50*** 
(0.08) 
-0.51*** 
(0.08) 
β 
2.17*** 
(0.37) 
2.34*** 
(0.44) 
1.96*** 
(0.34) 
1.90*** 
(0.41) 
2.10*** 
(0.38) 
1.98*** 
(0.33) 
1.84*** 
(0.38) 
1.75*** 
(0.37) 
γ 
1.07*** 
(0.34) 
0.91** 
(0.44) 
0.84*** 
(0.31) 
1.04*** 
(0.37) 
1.03*** 
(0.29) 
1.03*** 
(0.25) 
0.87** 
(0.37) 
1.21*** 
(0.27) 
μ 
1.03** 
(0.40) 
-3.67*** 
(1.21) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.19* 
(0.11) 
- - - - 
μNR - - - - 
0.19 
(0.25) 
-0.68 
(0.83) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
μR - - - - 
2.60** 
(1.06) 
-4.34*** 
(1.09) 
0.24** 
(0.10) 
0.52*** 
(0.18) 
SE 0.34 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.31 0.29 0.33 0.32 
μNR = μR - - - - 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.00 
 
Notes: This Table reports OLS estimates of Eq. (1), Columns 1-4, and Eq. (2), Columns 5-8, over the period 
1985:Q1 – 2008:Q4. The last row shows Wald test p-values of the null hypothesis that μNR = μR in Eq. (2). Standard 
errors in parentheses: White (in italic) in the presence of heteroskedasticity; Newey-West (in  bold italic) in the 
presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlelation. SE denotes the standard error of the regression. *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 2: Indirect reaction to financial market developments 
 
D
FCI 
(1) 
D
CSPR 
(2) 
D
SP500 
(3) 
D
LIQ 
(4) 
D
07-08 
(5) 
α 
-1.65 
(1.24) 
-1.64 
(1.62) 
-1.26 
(1.15) 
-0.48 
(1.17) 
0.06 
(0.76) 
ρ1 
1.49*** 
(0.08) 
1.43*** 
(0.08) 
1.45*** 
(0.08) 
1.46*** 
(0.08) 
1.29*** 
(0.08) 
ρ2 
-0.60*** 
(0.07) 
-0.53*** 
(0.07) 
-0.56*** 
(0.07) 
-0.57*** 
(0.07) 
-0.45*** 
(0.07) 
βND
 2.49*** 
(0.48) 
2.38*** 
(0.59) 
2.22*** 
(0.40) 
1.93*** 
(0.40) 
1.73*** 
(0.28) 
γND
 1.25** 
(0.59) 
0.97** 
(0.44) 
1.03*** 
(0.39) 
1.02*** 
(0.39) 
1.26*** 
(0.23) 
βD 
2.00*** 
(0.42) 
1.69*** 
(0.56) 
1.72*** 
(0.46) 
0.95 
(0.69) 
-1.41 
(1.02) 
γD 
1.09** 
(0.44) 
1.05 
(1.22) 
0.75 
(0.59) 
1.02 
(0.62) 
1.99*** 
(0.62) 
SE 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.31 
βND = βD  0.09 0.17 0.09 0.05 0.00 
γND= γD 0.83 0.94 0.70 0.99 0.26 
 
Notes: This table (Columns 1-4) reports OLS estimates of Eq. (3) over the period 1985:Q1 – 2008:Q4. Column 5 
shows estimates of Eq. (3) where the financial stress dummy variable is restricted to capture only the last 
financial crisis, i.e. takes value 1 during 2007:Q4 –2008:Q4. The last two rows show Wald test p-values of the 
null hypotheses that βND = βD  and  γND= γD, respectively, in Eq. (3). See also Table 1 notes. 
 
 
Table 3: Direct reaction to financial market developments and the 2007-2008 crisis 
 
 
FCI 
(1) 
CSPR 
(2) 
SP500 
(3) 
LIQ 
(4) 
α 
-0.47 
(0.80) 
0.49 
(1.24) 
-0.78 
(0.91) 
0.09 
(0.90) 
ρ1 
1.36*** 
(0.08) 
1.32*** 
(0.07) 
1.38*** 
(0.09) 
1.37*** 
(0.09) 
ρ2 
-0.50*** 
(0.07) 
-0.47*** 
(0.06) 
-0.52*** 
(0.08) 
-0.50*** 
(0.08) 
β 
1.91*** 
(0.30) 
1.89*** 
(0.31) 
1.90*** 
(0.33) 
1.74*** 
(0.32) 
γ 
1.09*** 
(0.24) 
1.07*** 
(0.28) 
0.82*** 
(0.30) 
1.20*** 
(0.24) 
μNR 
0.48** 
(0.20) 
-0.96 
(0.98) 
0.03* 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
μR 
2.48** 
(0.94) 
-3.77*** 
(1.05) 
0.21*** 
(0.07) 
0.56*** 
(0.15) 
SE 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.31 
μNR = μR 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.001 
 
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of Eq. (2) over the period 1985:Q1 – 2008:Q4 where the recession 
dummy variable is restricted to capture only the last recession, i.e. takes value 1 during 2007:Q4 – 2008:Q4. See 
also Table 1 notes. 
 
